Category Archives: Aerospace & Defence

The NSA, the Use of Spies and The Art of War (Sun Tzu)

I reviewed yesterday the book “The Art of War“ (by Sun Tzu) from the point of view teamwork, communication and leadership as that was the interest I had when I have read it this second time. However, there was another chapter that called my attention given the ongoing NSA spying scandal (PRISM surveillance programme) disclosed by The Guardian and The Washington Post in 2013, that was the last on of the book “The Use of Spies“:

Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. […] There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. […] Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called “divine manipulation of the threads.” It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own purposes. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy’s camp.

Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.

[…] Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s ability to move.

And then comes the scandal, the reaction of global leaders subjected to espionage, of private companies, etc.

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Drones

The use of drones (how unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, are commonly called) in military operations has been very criticized in the past years, partly due to the collateral civilian casualties from such operations (close to 300 just in Pakistan in the past years). Nevertheless, the use of drones is here to stay. The US Department of Defense includes as part of its budgetary information an “Aircraft Procurement Plan FY2012-2041” [PDF, 332KB], see in the graphic below how it is planned to almost duplicate the drones in the fleet along the next decade:

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Unammned aerial vehicles in DoD inventory.

The civilian use of drones has been lagging behind these years mainly due to its integration in the air space. To that respect, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced last month an initial plan for integrating unmanned aircraft  into U.S. airspace by September 2015.

There are plenty of possible civilian applications that have been raised; from monitoring crops, to pipelines, oil rigs, forest fires, photography… to the dispatching of personal packages being announced recently by Amazon (Prime Air). The Economist issue of this week includes an article, “Game of drones“, which estimates that by 2017 there could be up to 10,000 drones flying in the USA and by 2025 the civilian drone market could have a size of up to 82bn$ per year, according to the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI).

In this general picture Europe has been left behind.

European air forces are still relying on US and Israeli drones (just this week France has received its first 2 MQ-9 Reaper from the USA). That is why I hope that the conclusion at the recent EU Council  (see here a post I wrote about it) in relation to the launching of a European Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone programme helps to put an end to that situation and enables Europe and its industry to bridge the gap:

[…] the development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in the 2020-2025 timeframe: preparations for a programme of a next-generation European Medium Altitude Long Endurance RPAS; the establishment of an RPAS user community among the participating Member States owning and operating these RPAS; close synergies with the European Commission on regulation (for an initial RPAS integration into the European Aviation System by 2016); appropriate funding from 2014 for R&D activities; […]

The bridging of that gap would not only ensure the security of supply of such drones for Europe but would help develop critical technologies to maintain the industrial base, its growth and employment; apart from the fact of being many of such technologies of dual use (as recognised in the EU Council conclusions) they would help Europe to access the market for civilian use of drones.

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Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Security and Defence is a topic which only makes it to the front pages of the media when there are actual war operations. Rarely a debate is centered on whether the country needs to foster its capabilities, invest in new defence technologies, or protect a certain industry base. I cannot recall a single electoral programme calling for such initiatives. The defence is not popular in today’s (European) society.

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Sun Tzu

Despite of that, and even if some Europeans take them today for granted, defence and security are no less crucial than many other public services which we expect States to provide us. As Javier Solana (former EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of NATO and Foreign Minister of Spain) put it few days ago in an article titled “Globalizing European Security“:

Global security – a safe and peaceful environment free of conflict – is a public good. In other words, all of the world’s citizens and countries benefit from it, regardless of whether they contribute to supplying it. Given this, free riders (those who enjoy the benefits of the good without investing in its provision) are likely to be plentiful. But, when it comes to global stability, the world simply cannot afford a free-riding Europe.

This obviously includes Europe: Europe cannot afford a free-riding Europe. As Anders Fogh Rasmussen (current Secretary-General of NATO and former Prime Minister of Denmark) put it yesterday:

I truly believe that we should do much more to educate society in the importance of peace, security and defence as goods to be protected and spread, so they can be better valued and supported.

EUCO Conclusions Defence, December 19, 2013 [PDF, 118KB]

EUCO conclusions on Defence, December 19, 2013 [PDF, 118KB]

Having said that, yesterday took place the first session of a 2-day EU Council in which one of the main topics to be dealt with was Security and Defence. Apart from the one cited above, there have been plenty of interesting articles in days prior to the meeting calling for decisions and actions to be taken by the council. To name a few:

In this post I just want to bring the European Council conclusions [PDF, 118KB] as already published and outline some of the passages.

2. The EU and its Member States must exercise greater responsibilities in response to those challenges if they want to contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP […]. The European Council calls on the Member States to deepen defence cooperation by improving the capacity to conduct missions and operations and by making full use of synergies in order to improve the development and availability of the required civilian and military capabilities, supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). This will also bring benefits in terms of growth, jobs and innovation to the broader European industrial sector.

4. […] the European Council has identified a number of priority actions built around three axes: increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; enhancing the development of capabilities and strengthening Europe’s defence industry.

5. […] The European Union and its Member States can bring to the international stage the unique ability to combine, in a consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice. […]

8. […] The European Council emphasises the need to improve the EU rapid response capabilities, including through more flexible and deployable EU Battle groups […]

9. New security challenges continue to emerge. […] the European Council calls for:

  • an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework in 2014 […]
  • an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014 […]
  • increased synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors […]
  • progress in developing CSDP support for third states and regions […]
  • further strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges.

10. Cooperation in the area of military capability development is crucial to maintaining key capabilities, remedying shortfalls and avoiding redundancies. Pooling demand, consolidating requirements and realising economies of scale will allow Member States to enhance the efficient use of resources and ensure interoperability, […]

11. The European Council remains committed to delivering key capabilities […]. Bearing in mind that the capacities are owned and operated by the Member States, it welcomes:

  • the development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in the 2020-2025 timeframe: preparations for a programme of a next-generation European Medium Altitude Long Endurance RPAS; the establishment of an RPAS user community among the participating Member States owning and operating these RPAS; close synergies with the European Commission on regulation (for an initial RPAS integration into the European Aviation System by 2016); appropriate funding from 2014 for R&D activities;
  • the development of Air-to-Air refuelling capacity: progress towards increasing overall capacity and reducing fragmentation, especially as regards the establishment of a Multi-Role Tanker Transport capacity, with synergies in the field of certification, qualification, in-service support and training;
  • Satellite Communication […]
  • Cyber: developing a roadmap and concrete projects […]

13. The European Council welcomes the existing cooperative models, such as the European Air Transport Command (EATC), and encourages Member States to explore ways to replicate the EATC model in other areas.
14. […] It encourages the further development of incentives for and innovative approaches to such cooperation, including by investigating non market-distorting fiscal measures in accordance with existing European law. […]

16. Europe needs a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to develop and sustain defence capabilities. This can also enhance its strategic autonomy and its ability to act with partners. The EDTIB should be strengthened to ensure operational effectiveness and security of supply, while remaining globally competitive and stimulating jobs, innovation and growth across the EU. These efforts should be inclusive with opportunities for defence industry in the EU, […]

17. A well-functioning defence market based on openness, equal treatment and opportunities, and transparency for all European suppliers is crucial. […] with a view to opening up the market for subcontractors from all over Europe, ensuring economies of scale and allowing a better circulation of defence products.

18. To ensure the long-term competitiveness of the European defence industry and secure the modern capabilities needed, it is essential to retain defence Research & Technology (R&T) expertise, especially in critical defence technologies. The European Council invites the Member States to increase investment in cooperative research programmes, […]. Civilian and defence research reinforce each other, including in key enabling technologies and on energy efficiency technology. The European Council therefore welcomes the Commission’s intention to evaluate how the results under Horizon 2020 could also benefit defence and security industrial capabilities. […] to develop proposals to stimulate further dual use research. […]

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Hudson Miracle Approach

Most of you probably heard about the US Airways flight 1549 which on January 15th, 2009, had to land on the river Hudson (New York, USA) due to the loss of engine thrust right after bird strikes in the climb path.

Despite of the recognized initial denial reported by the Captain in the interview below, crucial decisions were taken within the 1st minute after the event. See the captain’s explanations [10 minutes]:

If you want to “re-live” what happened, see the 3-D animation of the flight with the real recorded voices of the conversation between the airplane and air traffic controllers:

This accident had a happy ending thanks to the several layers of safety that exist today in commercial aviation, just to name a few: contained engine failure, pilot training, clear communication protocols and phraseology, etc.

Today we can remember that episode with the following chart I found in Twitter via a work colleague:

Jeppesen KLGA/LGA chart, or "Hudson Miracle Approach".

Jeppesen KLGA/LGA chart, or “Hudson Miracle Approach”.

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Budget uncertainty in the Congress has kept the Boeing C-17 line open for years

Few days ago, I read in the weekly Aviation Week the following article, Boeing Blames Budget Uncertainty For C-17 Line Closure Timing, where Dennis Muilenburg, president of Boeing Defense, Space and Security, is quoted saying:

“… you quickly come to the conclusion that we cannot continue to spend money to keep that line open, given all of the other budget constraints. So, the fact that we are facing sequestration and uncertainty in the budget drove the timing of our decision.”

If anything, I would say the contrary: budget uncertainty in the Congress is what has kept the Boeing C-17 line open for the last years (coupled with international sales).

To understand that, it is important to remember that the C-17 program initially called for the acquisition of 120 aircraft. This number was later increased to 180 aircraft, and that the US Air Force had been requesting in its yearly budget requests zero aircraft per year since long ago. Only maneuvers in the Congress had been including in the final Defense Budget more C-17 units until the final 223 which were delivered (the last one in September 2013).

You can see an explanation of the plays that have taken place for years in the Congress in this article from 2009 in Business Week (“It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Pork!“):

The C-17 Globemaster offers one illustration of successful opposition to the Obama-Gates push for control of weapons spending. C-17s are large cargo planes produced by Boeing that cost $250 million apiece. They have been used heavily since 1993 to transport troops, tanks, and supplies. Every year since 2006, the Pentagon has said that it has enough C-17s. And every year, Congress overrules the military and authorizes funds for additional planes. In October the Senate approved $2.5 billion in the 2010 budget for 10 more C-17s, which would bring the fleet to 215.

[…]

But the real reason Congress wants more of them has little to do with military need. Boeing has built the C-17’s industrial base for political survivability.

The company has spread manufacturing across no fewer than 43 states. C-17 production lines employ more than 30,000 workers, many of them relatively well paid by factory-wage standards. Many of those jobs would be at risk if C-17 work ground to a halt.

The White House understands the challenge. “The impulse in Washington is to protect jobs back home, building things we don’t need at a cost we can’t afford,” President Obama said in August in a speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Phoenix. “The special interests, contractors, and entrenched lobbyists—they’re invested in the status quo, and they’re putting up a fight.”

[…]

Bond, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), and 16 colleagues began circulating a letter in April urging members of the Senate Appropriations Committee to keep funding the plane despite clearly stated objections from the White House and Pentagon. In California, C-17 production employs 5,000 workers at a final assembly plant in Long Beach.

[…]

These plays by politicians to try to keep the line open despite of the military not needing more aircraft continue to exist, as a few days ago we could read about a new plan: C-17 swap, to exchange older C-17s for new ones! (while the “old” ones have only about 20 years today possibly not having logged more  flight hours than two-thirds of their life).

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La última cena de William Perry

La semana pasada, con motivo de la celebración del día de la Hispanidad, el diario ABC publicaba una entrevista al ministro de defensa, Pedro Morenés (“Morenés: “Me preocupa el adiestramiento de las Fuerzas Armadas”“).

El portal InfoDefensa hacía referencia a dicha entrevista en la siguiente entrada, “Morenés: “Vamos a reforzar la industria de Defensa desde Navantia a Indra”“, donde además incluía unas declaraciones que no aparecen en la edición digital de ABC. En ellas el ministro habla de la necesidad de consolidar la industria de la defensa española para competir con las grandes empresas del sector: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAE, etc.

En esta entrada me quería centrar en una anécdota que se relata:

La anécdota de Weinberger (sic).

Según el diario, el ministró finalizó este tema mencionando una anécdota del secretario de Defensa de EEUU Caspar Weinberger (1981-1987):

“Cuando el señor Weinberger dijo a las cincuenta y tantas empresas de Defensa que había en EEUU, o más, “el año que viene por estas fechas, cuando yo les invite a cenar en esta mesa en la que hoy hay ciento y pico personas, va a haber doce. Arréglenselas ustedes como puedan”. Les dio un mensaje muy claro. Al final hubo 12.

En esta entrada en el blog solo quería precisar:

  • La cena no fue con Weinberger como secretario de defensa (1981-87), sino con Les Aspin en 1993.
  • No fue el secretario de defensa (entonces Les Aspin) sino William Perry (subsecretario entonces, y que posteriormente fue secretario de defensa) quien dijo aquello.
  • No había ciento y pico personas que luego pasaron a 12; sino 12 en la cena que luego pasaron a 5 (representando a Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon); por eso de que a la mesa iban 12 lo llamaron “última cena”.

Esta anécdota se puede leer en numerosas fuentes especializadas en asuntos de defensa y genéricas, como por ejemplo, The New York Times:

The changes now occurring began in the early 1990’s. Industry executives recall the famous ”Last Supper,’‘ a 1993 Pentagon dinner whose host was Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense, and his deputy, William J. Perry, who succeeded him. At the dinner were executives from a dozen contractors who were told by Mr. Perry that there were twice as many military suppliers as he wanted to see in five years and that the Government was prepared to watch some go out of business. From 1992 to 1997, a total of $55 billion in military-industry mergers took place, according to Securities Data Company, a research concern in Newark.

Quiero pensar que el ministro Pedro Morenés conoce bien la anécdota, y fue el periodista de ABC el que escuchó algo y no se enteró, y más tarde, en la redacción, la reconstruyó como quiso sin comprobar datos en ninguna fuente… raro es que no acabase atribuyendo la anécdota o cita a Wiston Churchill o Mark Twain.

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Boeing 747: 51 in backlog, rate of 1.5 per month… 2016?

I read a few days ago an article from Business Week on the launch of the Boeing 777X (“Boeing Unveils Its Jumbo Killer“). In that article, Adam Pilarski, senior vice president at aerospace consultant Avitas is quoted saying “My assumption is the 747 is dead, or will be dead in a year or two”.

Yesterday, Boeing announced that it will cut down the production rate down to 1.5 aircraft per month (see article in Bloomberg).

Boeing has only been able to book 107 orders and has still in backlog 51 of them. Thus, at the new rate the line would last open just a bit below 3 more years, reaching mid 2016.

That is remarkable taking into consideration that the first deliveries took place in 1969, that would be a production streak of almost 50 years.

The dark side of it is that if no orders are booked between now and then, in just about one year two aircraft production lines such as the C-17 and the 747 would be closed.

However, Boeing still sees a future in the 747 and expects to revamp production again in the following years, especially in the freighter market, however in the past 6 years sales have amounted to 22 aircraft, an average of 4 per year… clearly below the needed to maintain the new production rate (18/year).

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  • In this post I compared the sales of A380 and 747 at each program start.
  • Review I wrote about the book 747, “747”, by Joe Sutter with Jay Spencer.

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Is the average aircraft size decreasing or increasing by 25%?

Last year, I wrote a post (Aircraft average size: Boeing’s forecast in 1990 and following evolution) in which I compared what was Boeing’s prediction in 1990 of what was going to be the commercial aircraft average size evolution in the next 15 years versus the same prediction in 1997 and what had been the actual evolution through 2011, as reflected in Boeing’s 2012 Current Market Outlook (CMO).

See the graphics below:

Average aircraft size forecast made in 1990.

Average aircraft size evolution 1991-2011, according to Boeing 2012 CMO.

As I mentioned above, the information of actual evolution was provided by Boeing in 2012’s CMO.

This year (2013), Airbus seems to have responded by providing the same piece of information in its Global Market Forecast (GMF), see the picture below:

Average aircraft size evolution 1992-2012, according to Airbus.

Average aircraft size evolution 1992-2012, according to Airbus 2013 GMF.

The catch then is: is the average aircraft size decreasing (as Boeing says) or increasing by 25% (as Airbus says)?

The best part of the catch is that both cite the same source of information, OAG (Official Airline Guide).

The reader will obviously reach to the conclusion that both companies cannot be taking the same segmentation and that they are using the reported trend to convey an interested message.

After, having seen the number plays that Boeing has recently done in their CMO with the mix of wide-bodies widely changing from year to year in order to promote 787 or 777 (which explained in this post), I take the stand to take with grain of salt the graphic provided by Boeing, and thus, unless I see the numbers by myself, I will understand that average aircraft size has been growing since the 1990s (1).

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(1) The funny thing of understanding that the correct interpretation is the one of Airbus (average size has grown by 25%) is that this would mean that Boeing’s own prediction in 1990 would have been proven correct! 🙂

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Keys to airlines profitability

Few days ago I read the following tweet from IATA (International Air Transport Association):

It linked an interesting article from its website, where some (brutal) keys about the airline business are summarized:

  • It is estimated that $4 trillion to $5 trillion will be needed to buy the aircraft necessary for growth in the next 20 years (see Airbus and Boeing forecasts here).
  • 75% of the world’s airlines are at least majority owned by the private sector. 
  • According to a new IATA study, Profitability and the Air Transport Value Chain [PDF, 3.5 MB], in the airline industry — hyper-competitive and suffering from numerous structural problems —investors have never reached WACC.
  • During 2004–2011, the airline industry worldwide  averaged a ROIC of 4.1%. This is an improvement on the average of 3.8% generated in the previous business cycle 1996–2004 but it is nowhere near WACC (7.5%).
  • In 2012 airlines made just 2.56$ per passenger.
  • Fuel has risen to become more than 30% of an airline’s operating costs despite far more efficient operations and engines.
  • Air transport generates somewhere between $16 billion and $48 billion in profits for fuel companies every year.
  • The airline industry has done a pretty good job at cutting cost, with a 60% fall in real terms over the past 40 years.
  • The problem from an investor perspective is that all of those cost reductions have been passed through to customers, leaving equity investors unpaid for risking their capital.
  • Looking at the overall investment picture, investors would get $17 billion more per year if they put their money in equities and bonds of a similar risk profile outside the airline industry.
Air transport generates (...) profits for fuel companies.

Air transport generates (…) profits for fuel companies.

Sad situation of the sector from the point of view of an aviation enthusiast. Nevertheless, all these conclusions necessarily lead me to the following two quotes from remarkable businessmen:

Warren Buffett: “The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.”

Richard Branson: “The quickest way to become a millionaire in the airline business is to start out as a billionaire.”

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Airbus vs. Boeing, comparison of market forecasts (2013)

Last Tuesday, John Leahy, Airbus COO Customers, unveiled at a press conference in London the new figures of the 2013-32 Airbus’ Global Market Forecast (GMF, PDF 5.1MB).

The last two years, I already published comparisons of both Airbus’ and Boeing’s forecasts (Current Market Outlook, CMO, PDF 3.0MB). You can find below the update of such comparison with the latest released figures from both companies.

Comparison of Airbus GMF and Boeing CMO 2013-2032.

Comparison of Airbus GMF and Boeing CMO 2013-2032.

Some comments about the comparison:

  • Boeing sees demand for 14% more passenger aircraft (excluding regional a/c, same proportion as last year) with a 9% more value (excluding freighters).
  • Boeing continues to play down A380 niche potential (54% less a/c than Airbus’ GMF), though for third year in a row it has slightly increased its Very Large market forecast, again by 20 a/c, or 3.4%.
  • On the other hand, Boeing forecasts about 350 twin-aisle and 4,400 single-aisle more than Airbus, clearly pointing to its point-to-point strategy versus the connecting mega-cities rationale presented by Airbus.
  • In terms of RPKs (“revenue passenger kilometer”), that is, the number of paying passenger by the distance they are transported, they see a similar future: Airbus forecasts for 2032 ~14 RPKs (in trillion) (a ~9% increase vs last year GMF) while Boeing forecasts 14.7 (also increased about 7%).

The main changes from last year’s forecasts are:

  • Both manufacturers have increased their passenger aircraft forecast, ~1,000 a/c Airbus and 1,400 a/c Boeing, bigger increase than last year’s change (500 a/c both).
    • In the case of Airbus it has again mainly increased the single aisle segment (700 a/c), probably reflecting the success of the A320neo launch.
    • In the case of Boeing, they decreased the twin aisle segment (80 a/c), but increased the single aisle in over 1,400 a/c.
    • As I noted in a previous post, Boeing dramatically changed the twin-aisle mix, between small and intermediate. Now it has a mix closer to that of Airbus (60-70% of small twin-aisle).
  • Both manufacturers have increased the value of RPKs in 2032  (9% and 7%).
  • Both manufacturers have increased the volume (trn$) of the market in this 20 years, again 12% Airbus (to 4.1trn$) and 3% Boeing (to 4.5trn$) (excluding regionals and freighters).

Some catchy lines for those who have never seen these type of forecasts:

  • Passenger world traffic (RPK) will continue to grow about 4.7% per year (5.0% according to Boeing). This is, doubling every ~15 years.
  • Today there are about 16,100 passenger aircraft around the world (according to Airbus), this number will more than double in the next 20 years to above 33,600 a/c in 2032.
  • 2/3 of the population of the emerging countries will take a trip a year in 2032.
  • Domestic travel in China will be the largest traffic flow in 2032 with almost 1,400bn RPK, or 10% of the World’s traffic.
  • The A20 family: a take-off every 2.5 seconds, with 99.6% reliability.
Trips per capita vs. GDP per capita (source: Airbus GMF).

Trips per capita vs. GDP per capita (source: Airbus GMF).

As I do every year, I strongly recommend both documents (GMF and CMO) which provide a wealth of information of market dynamics. In case you find it tough, to read those kind of booklets, you may take a look at the video of the press conference, a great class on global economy, world aviation, forecasting, trend spotting (1h08’28”):

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