Tag Archives: Airbus

A380: “one-off items” versus “accounting block”

Aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia recently published an opinion article at Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine, Airbus Twin-Aisles—Big Needs, Limited Means, in which he discussed strategic product portfolio options for Airbus. He was particularly critical to the A380. Let me bring a couple of passages from the article:

Historically, Airbus has spent more than Boeing on development as a percent of sales than. But during the past 15 years, the bulk of this heavy spending was squandered on the A380. Today, development spending is set to fall in line with the company’s new direction. Last year, it fell below 6% for the first time since the company was established (see graph). Given the requirements of funding the A350XWB and A320neo, Airbus isn’t likely to have the resources to fund both an A330neo and A380neo and a new large twin, too. Tough choices will need to be made. […]

In short, Airbus will be paying the price for the A380 for many years to come.

From these 2 paragraphs, the first assertions are factual: Airbus spends more on research and development than Boeing Commercial Airplanes and during the last years most of that spending was dedicated to the A380. In my opinion the last sentence overstates the issue of the current burden of A380 over the company’s future. If the A380 did not derail EADS during 2006-2010 it will not do so in the coming years. As numbers show and top management has indicated at investors events the A380 programme is expected “to emerge from the red by 2015“.

A380 MSN4 (credit: A. Doumenjou).

Today the A380 is a recurring cost issue, not more. The situation would be entirely different had Airbus (or rather EADS, now Airbus Group) applied the same accounting system that Boeing does (since the merger with McDonnell Douglas). EADS has passed in the profit and loss accounts in the previous years several one-off items related to the A380 valued in billions of euros (refer to yearly financial reports). What is left are R&D (mainly D) expenses to bring down unitary recurring costs and producing enough numbers of aircraft so that learning curve effects can be benefited from.

On the other hand, Boeing accounting system spreads the capital expenditures and research and development costs along what they refer to as an accounting block, which for example for the 787 now takes 1,300 airplanes to amortize those costs (previously were 1,100, see here a post on the 787 break even).

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Is the average aircraft size decreasing or increasing by 25%?

Last year, I wrote a post (Aircraft average size: Boeing’s forecast in 1990 and following evolution) in which I compared what was Boeing’s prediction in 1990 of what was going to be the commercial aircraft average size evolution in the next 15 years versus the same prediction in 1997 and what had been the actual evolution through 2011, as reflected in Boeing’s 2012 Current Market Outlook (CMO).

See the graphics below:

Average aircraft size forecast made in 1990.

Average aircraft size evolution 1991-2011, according to Boeing 2012 CMO.

As I mentioned above, the information of actual evolution was provided by Boeing in 2012’s CMO.

This year (2013), Airbus seems to have responded by providing the same piece of information in its Global Market Forecast (GMF), see the picture below:

Average aircraft size evolution 1992-2012, according to Airbus.

Average aircraft size evolution 1992-2012, according to Airbus 2013 GMF.

The catch then is: is the average aircraft size decreasing (as Boeing says) or increasing by 25% (as Airbus says)?

The best part of the catch is that both cite the same source of information, OAG (Official Airline Guide).

The reader will obviously reach to the conclusion that both companies cannot be taking the same segmentation and that they are using the reported trend to convey an interested message.

After, having seen the number plays that Boeing has recently done in their CMO with the mix of wide-bodies widely changing from year to year in order to promote 787 or 777 (which explained in this post), I take the stand to take with grain of salt the graphic provided by Boeing, and thus, unless I see the numbers by myself, I will understand that average aircraft size has been growing since the 1990s (1).

(1) The funny thing of understanding that the correct interpretation is the one of Airbus (average size has grown by 25%) is that this would mean that Boeing’s own prediction in 1990 would have been proven correct! 🙂

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Airbus vs. Boeing, comparison of market forecasts (2013)

Last Tuesday, John Leahy, Airbus COO Customers, unveiled at a press conference in London the new figures of the 2013-32 Airbus’ Global Market Forecast (GMF, PDF 5.1MB).

The last two years, I already published comparisons of both Airbus’ and Boeing’s forecasts (Current Market Outlook, CMO, PDF 3.0MB). You can find below the update of such comparison with the latest released figures from both companies.

Comparison of Airbus GMF and Boeing CMO 2013-2032.

Comparison of Airbus GMF and Boeing CMO 2013-2032.

Some comments about the comparison:

  • Boeing sees demand for 14% more passenger aircraft (excluding regional a/c, same proportion as last year) with a 9% more value (excluding freighters).
  • Boeing continues to play down A380 niche potential (54% less a/c than Airbus’ GMF), though for third year in a row it has slightly increased its Very Large market forecast, again by 20 a/c, or 3.4%.
  • On the other hand, Boeing forecasts about 350 twin-aisle and 4,400 single-aisle more than Airbus, clearly pointing to its point-to-point strategy versus the connecting mega-cities rationale presented by Airbus.
  • In terms of RPKs (“revenue passenger kilometer”), that is, the number of paying passenger by the distance they are transported, they see a similar future: Airbus forecasts for 2032 ~14 RPKs (in trillion) (a ~9% increase vs last year GMF) while Boeing forecasts 14.7 (also increased about 7%).

The main changes from last year’s forecasts are:

  • Both manufacturers have increased their passenger aircraft forecast, ~1,000 a/c Airbus and 1,400 a/c Boeing, bigger increase than last year’s change (500 a/c both).
    • In the case of Airbus it has again mainly increased the single aisle segment (700 a/c), probably reflecting the success of the A320neo launch.
    • In the case of Boeing, they decreased the twin aisle segment (80 a/c), but increased the single aisle in over 1,400 a/c.
    • As I noted in a previous post, Boeing dramatically changed the twin-aisle mix, between small and intermediate. Now it has a mix closer to that of Airbus (60-70% of small twin-aisle).
  • Both manufacturers have increased the value of RPKs in 2032  (9% and 7%).
  • Both manufacturers have increased the volume (trn$) of the market in this 20 years, again 12% Airbus (to 4.1trn$) and 3% Boeing (to 4.5trn$) (excluding regionals and freighters).

Some catchy lines for those who have never seen these type of forecasts:

  • Passenger world traffic (RPK) will continue to grow about 4.7% per year (5.0% according to Boeing). This is, doubling every ~15 years.
  • Today there are about 16,100 passenger aircraft around the world (according to Airbus), this number will more than double in the next 20 years to above 33,600 a/c in 2032.
  • 2/3 of the population of the emerging countries will take a trip a year in 2032.
  • Domestic travel in China will be the largest traffic flow in 2032 with almost 1,400bn RPK, or 10% of the World’s traffic.
  • The A20 family: a take-off every 2.5 seconds, with 99.6% reliability.
Trips per capita vs. GDP per capita (source: Airbus GMF).

Trips per capita vs. GDP per capita (source: Airbus GMF).

As I do every year, I strongly recommend both documents (GMF and CMO) which provide a wealth of information of market dynamics. In case you find it tough, to read those kind of booklets, you may take a look at the video of the press conference, a great class on global economy, world aviation, forecasting, trend spotting (1h08’28”):

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A380 sales compared to 747 sales at program start

Some weeks ago, in a discussion with a colleague we tried to put into context whether the A380 sales were such a dismal or not.

My colleague first plotted A380 orders since the program launch (2001) in comparison to those of the 747 (1966). I show below the result:

A380 and 747 orders referenced to the year of launch of each program.

A380 and 747 orders referenced to the year of launch of each program.

Both programs show an initial sales rush at the time of program launch. In both cases the rhythm of sales slowed down after the second year. In the first 11 years of program, each had managed:

  • A380: 262 orders.
  • 747: 357 orders.

Thus, we can see that the Boeing 747 was selling better already from the beginning of the program.

However, I wanted to make yet another comparison: aircraft orders taking as reference the year of first delivery, having heard so often the industry mantra that some potential customers would want to wait to see the aircraft in operation before placing orders. See below this second comparison:

A380 and 747 orders referenced to the year the 1st aircraft delivery of each program.

A380 and 747 orders referenced to the year the 1st aircraft delivery of each program.

In this case, and due to the shorter time to develop the Boeing 747 since program launch (1966), the difference in sales is narrowed:

  •  A380: 262 orders.
  • 747: 281 orders.

You can see that still, 5 years after the 1st delivery of each aircraft (2007 for the A380 and 1969 for the 747) Boeing had sold more aircraft, but with this reference the margin is lower, 19 aircraft.

Boeing 747. The Boeing 747 was the first wide-body in commercial aircraft history and still is the twin-aisle with the highest amount of aircraft sold (1,528 a/c as of today, probably to be soon overtaken by the 777) and delivered (1,464 a/c as of today). However, it has taken over 40 years to reach those numbers. The 1,000th unit sold was reached after 25 years of sales in 1990. The 1,000th unit delivered was also reached after 25 years of aircraft deliveries, in 1993.

Thus, in my opinion, when we want to measure the success of the A380 we cannot be distracted by the figures of other commercial aviation segments (single-aisle and small / intermediate twin-aisle) but we have to check what the 20-year forecasts for the Very Large Aircraft say:

  • ~1,300 aircraft according to Airbus GMF,
  • ~600 aircraft according to Boeing CMO,

and then see what could be expected market share for the A380 against those forecasts and whether it is getting the orders to reach it or not.

You can find orders and deliveries figures in both manufacturers websites or summarized here: A380 and 747.

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Twin-aisle aircraft deliveries 20-year forecast

I read in the following article “Airbus seeks to increase Washington State supply business; aims for 13 A350s/mo” (from Leeham News) how from a presentation of a A350 supplier (ElectroImpact) at an aerospace suppliers event in Washington State, it was concluded that the Airbus aimed at building 13 A350s per month, as the mentioned supplier had built its factory with capacity to extend production rates up to those 13 aircraft.

This would be news because in its presentations Airbus talks about a production ramp-up up to 10 a/c per month (as does Boeing for the 787, which 10 aircraft/month should be reached by the end of 2013).

Having analyzed several times Airbus’ Global Market Forecast (GMF) and Boeing’s Current Market Outlook (CMO), I believe that those production rates of above 10 aircraft per month should be expected by industry followers just by seeing the numbers included in those forecasts.

In 2012, the GMF forecasted about 6,500 twin-aisle to be delivered in the next 20 years. The CMO indicated 7,210 aircraft. In 2013, Boeing CMO slightly reduced the figure to 7,130 a/c.

Comparison of Airbus GMF and Boeing CMO 2012-2031.

Thus, both companies expect between 6,500 to 7,200 twin-aisle passenger aircraft to be delivered in the following 20 years (excluding freighters, 747 and A380 – these 2 considered as Very Large Aircraft in the studies).

1st approach. If we were to take the mid-point of both forecasts, about 6,850 a/c, and simply divided by 20 years, we would reach to an average figure of 343 twin-aisle aircraft to be delivered per year between the 2 manufacturers, or 28 a/c per month. If Airbus wanted to maintain the long-term 50% market share, it would have to aim at delivering 14 a/c per month between all its twin-aisle products, which soon will be A330 and A350.

2nd approach. However, current twin-aisle production levels are in no way close to those 343 a/c per year. In 2012 there were 258 deliveries thanks to the introduction of 787s, but in the previous decade the average was about ~165 a/c per year. Thus, manufacturers must have a deliveries’ ramp up to accommodate those 6,850 in the next 20 years. Not knowing what that ramp-up is, I just linearized from where we are today and what is to be delivered.

I plotted in the graphic below all the deliveries of twin-aisle (excluding Very Large Aircraft) from the 1970s to 2012, and then what a forecast could be departing from 2012 deliveries’ figure to accommodate ~6,850 a/c in the next 20 years.

Taking a look at the graphic, one can already understand that if we take the GMF and CMO forecasts as good ones, the manufacturing rhythm will have to accelerate in the following years, especially in the second decade. In the late 2020s, over 400 twin-aisle would have to be delivered per year (over 33 per month), thus manufacturers will have to churn above 16 a/c per month each, that is the double of what they produced during the last decade.

Twin-aisle deliveries: historic series (1970s-2012) and forecast (excludes VLA -A380  & 747).

Twin-aisle deliveries: historic series (1970s-2012) and forecast (excludes VLA -A380 & 747).

Market shares. One could wonder whether this growth will favour more one company or the other. I compared market shares (excluding VLA):

  • in 2012: Boeing delivered 155 twin-aisle (26 767s, 83 777s, 46 787s) vs. Airbus 103 a/c (101 A330s, 2 A340s)… 60% / 40%.
  • in 2003-2012: Boeing delivered 839 twin aisle (148 767s, 642 777s, 49 787s) vs. Airbus 880 a/c (44 A300s, 687 A330s, 149 A340s)… 48% / 51%.
  • in 1993-2012: Boeing delivered 1,687 twin aisle (572 767s, 1,066 777s, 49 787s) vs. Airbus 1,521 a/c (175 A300s, 31 A310s, 938 A330s, 377 A340s)… 50% / 45%.

[The shares in the past decades include marginal deliveries from Ilyushin models and McDonnell Douglas models, which share I kept out of Boeing even after the merger in august 1997, these are ~30 a/c to be added to the 1,687]

Seeing that market shares have been fluctuating but always around 40-60% for each company, they could expect to have to at least deliver 40% of those 6,850 a/c in 20 years, or of those above 400 a/c in the late 2020s.

Backlog. Finally, just to see how the twin-aisle mix for each company is going to be, let’s look at the aircraft on order (backlog) that each company has as of today (end June 2013):

  • Airbus (43%):
    • A330: 260 a/c to be delivered.
    • A350: 678 a/c to be delivered.
  • Boeing (57%):
    • 767: 56 a/c to be delivered.
    • 777: 339 a/c to be delivered.
    • 787: 864 a/c to be delivered.

Thus, of the 6,850 twin-aisle to be delivered in the next 20 years, about 2,200 are already contracted as of today (plus the above 130 a/c delivered within the first half of 2013), thus 33% of those 6,850 a/c is more or less secured and among those the split is 57 / 43 for Boeing.

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Dear Congressman, send the C-27Js to The Boneyard

I read yesterday the following article from Aviation Week & Space Technology: “U.S. Coast Guard Patrol Aircraft May Fall To Cuts“. Part of the article stated the obvious, that the Coast Guard modernization programs may fall also victims of the budgetary pressures faced elsewhere in the Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security. However, the following passage caught my attention:

“While the results of the portfolio review, started in April, remain to be seen, the Coast Guard has not given up on gaining new equipment. Obama administration officials are looking at transferring at least 14 newly built Finmeccanica C-27J transports from the Air Force, which has controversially declared them “excess” to its needs. As CRS reported, if the Coast Guard were to receive 14 or more C-27s, it could stop procurement of EADS HC-144A maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) at the halfway point, with 18 aircraft, saving $887 million.”

I was amazed, since:

The rationale behind was the potential saving of up to 800M$ in acquisition costs (not buying the remaining 18 out of 36 aircraft which originally made up the Deepwater program) and getting some 14 C-27J instead…

If I were an US Congressman looking for savings across the US Armed Services, I would have it clear: instead of interfering with sound acquisition programs, I would simply get those C-27Js already acquired, send a couple of them to museums and the rest to The Boneyard in Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, to lay there forever close to their older brothers the C-27As and avoid any cost-ineffective operating and maintenance expenses on them…

The only cost-effective C-27s are in the desert (or already scrapped).

The only cost-effective C-27s are in the desert (or already scrapped).

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Commercial airplanes discounts review

Last week, ahead of the start of the Le Bourget air show, the French portal Challenges.fr, published an article “Le vrai prix des avions d’Airbus et de Boeing” with an interesting graphic showing a comparison of the prices after discounts of commercial aircraft both of Boeing and Airbus.

Find the graphic below:

Commercial aircraft discounts according to "Challenges".

Commercial aircraft discounts according to “Challenges”.

In order to make the graphic, Challenges quotes as sources the consultants of “ASCEND Worldwide” (which has the industry-reference database of world commercial aircraft fleets) and unnamed companies (airlines such as American, Delta or Southwest, as per declaration of analysts quoted in the article).

I have published in this blog yearly estimates for the average discount that Boeing applies to its aircraft. Find here the latest of that blog posts. In that post I arrived to an estimated average discount of 45%. Thus, when I read the article by Challenges I first thought “too high, to be average prices”. I thus run the reverse calculation: departing from Challengesmarket prices” I calculated what would have been Boeing Commercial’s 2012 revenues (1).

Boeing 2012 deliveries and net orders.

Boeing 2012 deliveries and net orders.

Boeing prices as per Challenges (767 added with the same discount as the 777-300ER).

Boeing prices as per Challenges (767 added with the same discount as the 777-300ER).

Boeing Airplanes revenues "as per Challenges".

Boeing Airplanes revenues “as per Challenges“.

Having run the numbers, I find the estimated value of 2012 revenues for Boeing Airplanes as too low (44bn$ vs. the reported 49bn$) using aircraft “market prices” as published by Challenges, as I first thought. I guess that the figures that Challenges published refer to the higher discounts having recently been applied, to the biggest customers making the biggest orders, such as those mentioned in the article (American, Delta or Southwest).

Thus, I would not take them as average or market price, those are the prices that a few can get.

(1) A couple of considerations must be made: Challenges does not publish any market price for 767s (the same discount of the 777-300ER was used), and does publish only one price of 737NGs or 777s; thus the result will not be very accurate.

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French aviation history through the life of its pioneers…

I moved to France about two years ago to work for Airbus in its Blagnac offices. Blagnac is a small village close to Toulouse. The place radiates passion for aviation (I once shared the geek outlook of my dentist’s waiting room).

My office is located at the avenue Didier Daurat, to get there I cross two roundabouts: Maurice Bellonte and Émile Dewoitine… these names probably do not ring a bell to most of you. Neither did to me. But then the back street is called Charles Lindbergh. It is then that you realize what might be going on and wonder who the previous names were.

Many months ago I collected the names of some of the streets of Blagnac and Colomiers (the village at the other side of the airport were Airbus is also located), and then, with the help of Google and Wikipedia, I searched who they were. I started a trip into French aviation history through the life of its pioneers…

Didier Daurat (EN):

Daurat was a fighter pilot during World War I, distinguishing himself by spotting the Paris Gun which was pounding Paris.

After the war, he joined Latécoère’s airline company, (which later became the Compagnie générale aéropostale – Aéropostale, then Air France) where he was a pilot and later operations director.

From this time, the legend of the man with the iron will made Didier Daurat a boss admired by many, feared by all and hated by some. He did not hesitate to dismiss those who showed the slightest sign of weakness, questioned his methods or did not adhere to the ‘spirit of the mail’ (l’esprit du courrier).

Many of his pilots began their careers as grease monkeys, taking apart, cleaning and reassembling engines. According to Daurat, this formed character and taught pilots to respect their machines. But he knew when he saw a talented pilot. When Jean Mermoz presented himself in Toulouse and made a dazzling display of piloting skill, Daurat told him “I don’t need circus artists but bus drivers.” (“Je n’ai pas besoin d’artistes de cirque mais de conducteurs d’autobus”). Nevertheless, he engaged him to clean the engines. […]

Dewoitine D.333 assembly (public domain image).

Émile Dewoitine (EN, FR):

[…] Émile Dewoitine entered the aviation industry by working at Latécoère during World War I. In 1920, he founded his own company, but facing little success at home, went to Switzerland where his Dewoitine D.27 fighter was accepted for operational service.

In 1931, Dewoitine went back to France and founded Société Aéronautique Française – Avions Dewoitine. During the 1930s, several noteworthy aircraft rolled out of the Toulouse-based Dewoitine factories including the Dewoitine D.500, the French Air Force’s first fully metallic, monoplane fighter, as well as the Dewoitine D.338 airliner.

In 1936, part of the French aviation industry was nationalized and Dewoitine’s factories were absorbed by the state-owned SNCAM. During the Battle of France in 1940, the Dewoitine D.520 turned out to be France’s best fighter aircraft. […]

Maurice Bellonte (FR):

Maurice Bellonte […] est un aviateur français. Associé à Dieudonné Costes, il a réussi en 1930, à bord du Breguet XIX “Point d’interrogation”, la première traversée de l’Atlantique Nord d’est en ouest. […]

Dieudonné Costes (EN, FR):

Dieudonné Costes […] was a French aviator who set flight distance records. He was also a fighter ace during World War I. […]

On 26 September 1926 he flew 4,100 km (2,546 miles) from Paris to Assuan, with René de Vitrolles, attempting at breaking a world distance record. He broke the world distance record on 28 October 1926, flying 5,396 km (3,351 miles) from Paris to Jask, Persia, with J. Rignot, as a part of 19,625-km (12,187-mile) Paris-India-Paris flight.

Between 10 October 1927 and 14 April 1928 Costes and Joseph Le Brix flew 57,410 km (35,652 miles) around the world, in Breguet 19GR named Nungesser-Coli, from Paris through Argentina, Brazil, the United States, Japan, India, and Greece, although they traveled across the Pacific Ocean from San Francisco, California, to Tokyo, Japan, by ship.

On 1–2 September 1930, Costes with Maurice Bellonte, flew the Breguet 19 Super Bidon “?” from Paris to New York, as the first heavier-than-air aircraft to cross the North Atlantic in the more difficult westbound direction between the North American and European mainlands. They covered either 5,850 km (3,633 miles) or 6,200 km (3,850 miles), according to different sources, in 37 hours 18 minutes. While flying over Portsmouth, New Hampshire, they lost their navigational map out of an open window of the plane. Two children saw the map falling from the sky while they were watching for the flight to cross over their farm. The children, Louise Stef and her brother John, returned the map to Costes, who had asked for its return through the media.

Joseph Le Brix (EN, FR):

Joseph Le Brix est d’abord un officier de marine, atteignant le grade de lieutenant de vaisseau, avant de se tourner vers l’aviation.

Avec Dieudonné Costes, il réussit, sur un Breguet 19 baptisé Nungesser et Coli en l’honneur des deux aviateurs français disparus dans l’Atlantique nord à bord de l’Oiseau blanc, la traversée de l’Atlantique sud entre Saint-Louis du Sénégal et Natal (Brésil) où ils arrivent le 15 octobre 1927.

Henri Potez (EN, FR):

Henry Potez […] was a French aircraft industrialist.

He studied in the French aeronautics school Supaéro. With Marcel Dassault, he was the inventor of the Potez-Bloch propeller which after 1917, have been set on most of all Allied planes of World War I.

In 1919, he founded his own company Aviations Potez that between the wars built many planes and seaplanes in factories at that time considered the most modern in the world. He bought the Alessandro Anzani company in 1923. Many Potez planes such as the Potez 25, 39, 54, 62, 63 were an international success, with world records. […]

Santos Dumont (EN):

Alberto Santos-Dumont […] was a Brazilian aviation pioneer. The heir of a wealthy family of coffee producers, Santos Dumont dedicated himself to aeronautical study and experimentation in Paris, France, where he spent most of his adult life.

Santos-Dumont designed, built, and flew the first practical dirigible, demonstrating that routine, controlled flight was possible. This “conquest of the air”, in particular his winning the Deutsch de la Meurthe prize on October 19, 1901 on a flight that rounded the Eiffel Tower, made him one of the most famous people in the world during the early 20th century. […]

Alberto Santos Dumont flying the Demoiselle (1909) (public domain image).

Santos-Dumont described himself as the first “sportsman of the air.” He started flying by hiring an experienced balloon pilot and took his first balloon rides as a passenger. He quickly moved on to piloting balloons himself, and shortly thereafter to designing his own balloons. In 1898, Santos-Dumont flew his first balloon design, the Brésil.

[…] his primary interest soon turned to heavier-than-air aircraft. By 1905 he had finished his first fixed-wing aircraft design, and also a helicopter. He finally achieved his dream of flying an aircraft on October 23, 1906 by piloting the 14-bis before a large crowd of witnesses for a distance of 60 metres (197 ft) at a height of about five meters or less (15 ft). This well-documented event was the first flight verified by the Aéro-Club de France of a powered heavier-than-air machine in Europe and won the Deutsch-Archdeacon Price for the first officially observed flight further than 25 meters. On November 12, 1906, Santos-Dumont set the first world record recognized by the Federation Aeronautique Internationale by flying 220 metres in 21.5 seconds.

[…]

The Wrights used a launching rail for their 1903 flights and a launch catapult for their 1904 and 1905 machines, while the aircraft of Santos-Dumont and other Europeans had wheeled undercarriages. The Wright Brothers continued to use skids, which necessitated the use of a dolly running on a track. The Fédération Aéronautique Internationale, founded in France in 1905 to verify aviation records, stated among its rules that an aircraft should be able to take off under its own power in order to qualify for a record. Supporters of Santos-Dumont maintain that this means the 14-bis was, technically, the first successful fixed-wing aircraft.

[…]

The wristwatch had already been invented by Patek Philippe, decades earlier, but Santos-Dumont played an important role in popularizing its use by men in the early 20th century. Before him they were generally worn only by women (as jewels), as men favoured pocket watches.

Clément Ader (EN, FR):

Clément Ader […] was a French inventor and engineer born in Muret, Haute Garonne, and is remembered primarily for his pioneering work in aviation.

Ader was an innovator in a number of electrical and mechanical engineering fields. He originally studied electrical engineering, and in 1878 improved on the telephone invented by Alexander Graham Bell. After this he established the telephone network in Paris in 1880. In 1881, he invented the “théâtrophone”, a system of telephonic transmission where listeners received a separate channel for each ear, enabling stereophonic perception of the actors on a set; it was this invention which gave the first stereo transmission of opera performances, over a distance of 2 miles (3 km) in 1881. In 1903, he devised a V8 engine for the Paris-Madrid race, but although three or four were produced, none were sold.

Following this, he turned to the problem of mechanical flight and until the end of his life gave much time and money to this. Using the studies of Louis Pierre Mouillard (1834–1897) on the flight of birds, he constructed his first flying machine in 1886, the Éole. It was a bat-like design run by a lightweight steam engine of his own invention, with 4 cylinders developing 20 horsepower (15 kW), driving a four-blade propeller. The engine weighed no more than 4 kg/kW (7 pounds per horsepower). The wings had a span of 14 metres and were equipped with a system of warping. All-up weight was 300 kg (650 pounds). On 9 October 1890, Ader attempted a flight of the Éole. It is accepted that the aircraft took off, reaching a height of 20 cm, and flew uncontrolled for approximately 50 m (160 ft), 13 years before the Wright Brothers.

Ader undertook the construction of a second aircraft he called the Avion II, also referred to as the Zephyr or Éole II. Most sources agree that work on this aircraft was never completed, and it was abandoned in favour of the Avion III. Ader’s later claim that he flew the Avion II in August 1892 for a distance of 100 metres in Satory near Paris, was never widely accepted.

[…] In 1909 he published L’Aviation Militaire, a very popular book which went through 10 editions in the five years before the First World War. It is notable for its vision of air warfare and its foreseeing the form of the modern aircraft carrier, with a flat flight deck, an island superstructure, deck elevators and a hangar bay. His idea for an aircraft carrier was relayed by the US Naval Attaché in Paris[8] and were followed by the first trials in the United States in November 1910.

An airplane-carrying vessel is indispensable. These vessels will be constructed on a plan very different from what is currently used. First of all the deck will be cleared of all obstacles. It will be flat, as wide as possible without jeopardizing the nautical lines of the hull, and it will look like a landing field.

—Clément Ader, L’Aviation Militaire, 1909

Marcel Doret (FR):

En 1910, il est apprenti mécanicien. Il s’engage à 18 ans, dès le début de la Grande Guerre dans l’artillerie et combat à Verdun. Il est blessé 3 ans plus tard et reçoit la médaille militaire. Une fois guéri, il demande son transfert dans l’aviation et rejoint Dijon puis Chartres. Lâché seul après moins de deux heures de vol en double commande, il est breveté pilote militaire en 1918, à l’âge de vingt-deux ans, et il poursuit sa formation à l’École de chasse et d’acrobatie de Pau après un court passage à Avord. À la fin de la guerre, il est ouvrier chez Renault, mais Émile Dewoitine le remarque dans un meeting aérien. Le 1er juin 1923, Doret entre comme pilote d’essai dans ses usines à Toulouse, et devient rapidement chef pilote d’essai. Jusqu’en 1939, il met au point quarante-trois prototypes d’appareils très différents, ce qui lui donne une maîtrise presque totale du pilotage. Avec la production des appareils de ligne, comme le D.332 Émeraude, il est amené à les convoyer dans des pays de plus en plus lointains et devient un des premiers pilotes de ligne.

Roland Garros (public domain image).

Roland Garros (EN):

[…] He started his aviation career in 1909 flying Alberto Santos-Dumont’s Demoiselle monoplane, an aircraft that only flew well with a small lightweight pilot. In 1911 Garros graduated to flying Bleriot monoplanes and entered a number of European air races with this type of machine, such as the 1911 Paris to Madrid air race.

He was already a noted aviator before World War I, having visited the U.S. and South America. By 1913 he had switched to flying the faster Morane-Saulnier monoplanes, and gained fame for making the first non-stop flight across the Mediterranean Sea from Fréjus in the south of France to Bizerte in Tunisia. The following year, Garros joined the French army at the outbreak of World War I. […]

In the early stages of the air war in World War I the problem of mounting a forward-firing machine gun on combat aircraft was considered by a number of individuals. The so-called interrupter gear did not come into use until Anthony Fokker developed a synchronization device which had a large impact on air combat; however, Garros also had a significant role in the process of achieving this goal.

As a reconnaissance pilot with the Escadrille MS26, Garros visited the Morane-Saulnier Works in December 1914. Saulnier’s work on metal deflector wedges attached to propeller blades was taken forward by Garros; he eventually had a workable installation fitted to his Morane-Saulnier Type L aircraft. Garros achieved the first ever shooting-down of an aircraft by a fighter firing through a tractor propeller, on 1 April 1915; two more victories over German aircraft were achieved on 15 and 18 April 1915.

On 18 April 1915, either Garros’ fuel line clogged or, by other accounts, his aircraft was downed by ground fire, and he glided to a landing on the German side of the lines. Garros failed to destroy his aircraft before being taken prisoner: most significantly, the gun and armoured propeller remained intact. Legend has it that after examining the plane, German aircraft engineers, led by Fokker, designed the improved interrupter gear system. In fact the work on Fokker’s system had been going for at least six months before Garros’ aircraft fell into their hands. With the advent of the interrupter gear the tables were turned on the Allies, with Fokker’s planes shooting down many Allied aircraft, leading to what became known as the Fokker Scourge.

L’escadrille Normandie Niemen (EN):

[…] was a fighter squadron, later regiment (of three squadrons) of the French Air Force. It served on the Eastern Front of the European Theatre of World War II with the 1st Air Army. The regiment is notable for being one of only two air combat units from an Allied western European country to participate on the Eastern Front during World War II, the other being the British No. 151 Wing RAF, and the only one to fight together with the Soviets until the end of the war in Europe.

[…] It fought in three campaigns on behalf of the Soviet Union between 22 March 1943, and 9 May 1945, during which time it destroyed 273 enemy aircraft and received numerous orders, citations and decorations from both France and the Soviet Union, including the French Légion d’Honneur and the Soviet Order of the Red Banner. Joseph Stalin awarded the unit the name Niemen for its participation in the Battle of the Niemen River (1944).

Georges Guynemer 1917 (public domain image).

Georges Guynemer (EN):

Georges Guynemer […] was a top fighter ace for France during World War I, and a French national hero at the time of his death. […]

He was originally rejected for military service, but was accepted for training as a mechanic in late 1914. With determination, he gained acceptance to pilot training, joining Escadrille MS.3 on 8 June 1915. He remained in the same unit for his entire service. He experienced both victory and defeat in the first plane allocated to him, a Morane-Saulnier L monoplane previously flown by Charles Bonnard, and accordingly named Vieux Charles (Old Charles). Guynemer kept the name and continued to use it for most of his later aircraft.

[…] Flying the more effective plane, Guynemer quickly established himself as one of France’s premier fighter pilots. He became an ace by his fifth victory in February 1916, and was promoted to lieutenant in March. At the year’s end, his score had risen to 25. Capitaine Brocard, commander of Escadrille N.3 (Storks), described Guynemer at that time as “…my most brilliant Stork.” Less than a year later, Guynemer was promoted to captain and commander of the Storks squadron.

[…] as described by one of his flying comrades (name withheld due to security reasons):

Guynemer sighted five machines of the Albatros type D-3. Without hesitation, he bore down on them. At that moment enemy patrolling machines, soaring at a great height, appeared suddenly and fell upon Guynemer. There were forty enemy machines in the air at this time, including Baron von Richthofen and his circus division of machines, painted in diagonal blue and white stripes. Toward Guynemer’s right some Belgian machines hove in sight, but it was too late. Guynemer must have been hit. His machine dropped gently toward the earth, and I lost track of it. All that I can say is that the machine was not on fire.

Only 22 at his death, he continued to inspire the nation with his advice, “Until one has given all, one has given nothing.”

René Fonck (EN, FR):

René Paul Fonck […] was a French aviator who ended the First World War as the top Allied fighter ace, and when all succeeding aerial conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries are also considered, Fonck still holds the title of “all-time Allied Ace of Aces”. He received confirmation for 75 victories (72 solo and three shared) out of 142 claims. Taking into account his probable claims, Fonck’s final tally could conceivably be nearer 100 or above. […]

Yet for all his skill and success, Fonck never captured the heart of the French public as Guynemer had. Fonck was ascetic and withdrawn. Instead of drinking or socializing with the other pilots, he planned his flying missions and tactics, ironed his uniforms, and stayed physically fit through calisthenics. He seemed to overcompensate for his shyness by constantly mentioning his exploits. As a result, he seemed distant, arrogant, even abrasive. His comrades respected his skills, but even one of his few friends, Marcel Haegelen, considered him a braggart and shameless self-promoter. Fonck may have resented the fact that Georges Guynemer remained more popular in the French press even after he surpassed him in victories. […]

Fonck returned to civilian life after World War I, and published his war memoirs Mes Combats, prefaced by Marechal Foch, in 1920.

During the 1920s, Fonck persuaded Igor Sikorsky to redesign the Sikorsky S-35 for the transatlantic race or Orteig Prize. On 21 September 1926, Fonck crashed on takeoff when the landing gear collapsed, killing two of his three crew members. Charles Lindbergh shortly afterward won the prize in 1927. […]

Charles Lindbergh (EN):

As a 25-year-old U.S. Air Mail pilot, Lindbergh emerged suddenly from virtual obscurity to instantaneous world fame as the result of his Orteig Prize-winning solo non-stop flight on May 20–21, 1927, made from Roosevelt Field located in Garden City on New York’s Long Island to Le Bourget Field in Paris, France, a distance of nearly 3,600 statute miles (5,800 km), in the single-seat, single-engine purpose built Ryan monoplane Spirit of St. Louis. Lindbergh, a U.S. Army Air Corps Reserve officer, was also awarded the nation’s highest military decoration, the Medal of Honor, for his historic exploit. […]

Henri Guillaumet (EN):

[…] He was a pioneer of French aviation in the Andes, the South Atlantic and the North Atlantic. He contributed to the opening up of numerous new routes and is regarded by some as the best pilot of his age. “Je n’en ai pas connu de plus grand” (I’ve never known a greater one), said Didier Daurat, owner of Aéropostale.

Guillaumet carried the mail between Argentina and Chile. On Friday 13 June 1930, while crossing the Andes for the 92nd time, he crashed his Potez 25 at Laguna del Diamante in Mendoza, Argentina, because of bad weather. He walked for a week over three mountain passes. Though tempted to give up, he persisted while thinking of his wife, Noëlle, until June 19 at dawn when he was rescued by a 14-year-old boy named Juan García. He reached a village whose inhabitants could not believe his story. This exploit made him stand out among the ‘stars’ of Aéropostale.

To his friend Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, who had come to find him, he said, “Ce que j’ai fait, je te le jure, aucune bête ne l’aurait fait.” (What I have done, I swear to you, no other animal would have done.) Saint-Exupéry tells the adventure of Guillaumet in his 1939 book Terre des Hommes (published in English as Wind, Sand and Stars).

After a number of south Atlantic crossings, he was appointed managing director of Air France. […]

In 1995, Futuroscope paid homage to Guillaumet with a 3D IMAX film by Jean-Jacques Annaud, Wings of Courage (les Ailes du Courage). […]

Saint-Exupéry (EN, FR):

[…] French aristocrat, writer, poet, and pioneering aviator. He became a laureate of several of France’s highest literary awards and also won the U.S. National Book Award. He is best remembered for his novella The Little Prince (Le Petit Prince) and for his lyrical aviation writings, including Wind, Sand and Stars and Night Flight.

Saint-Exupéry was a successful commercial pilot before World War II, working airmail routes in Europe, Africa and South America. At the outbreak of war, he joined the Armée de l’Air (French Air Force), flying reconnaissance missions until France’s armistice with Germany in 1940. After being demobilized from the French Air Force, he traveled to the United States to convince its government to enter the war against Nazi Germany quickly. Following a 27-month hiatus in North America, during which he wrote three of his most important works, he joined the Free French Air Force in North Africa, although he was far past the maximum age for such pilots and in declining health. He disappeared over the Mediterranean on his last assigned reconnaissance mission in July 1944, and is believed to have died at that time.

Jean Dabry (FR):

Jean Dabry […] est un pilote français de l’Aéropostale puis d’Air France.

D’abord officier au long cours, il entre à l’Aéropostale dès 1928 comme navigateur. Deux ans plus tard avec Jean Mermoz comme pilote et Léopold Gimié à la radio, il participe au record de distance en circuit fermé sur Latécoère 28.

Les 12 et 13 mai 1930, le même équipage effectue la première traversée postale de l’Atlantique Sud sur l’hydravion Laté 28 “Comte de la Vaulx”.

Lucien Servanty (FR):

[…] fut l’un des plus célèbres ingénieurs de l’histoire de l’aviation française.

Diplômé des Arts et Métiers, Servanty débuta en 1931 chez Breguet, puis entra en 1937 à la SNCASO lors de la création de celle-ci. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Servanty continua son activité sous le contrôle des autorités d’occupation mais réalisa aussi en secret l’étude du SO.6000 Triton, le premier avion à réaction français, qui effectua son premier vol en novembre 1946.

Par la suite, Servanty dirigea les études de plusieurs avions militaires d’importance tels que le SO.6020 Espadon et le SO.9000 Trident, prototype très innovateur d’un intercepteur à propulsion mixte turboréacteur-fusée. C’est toutefois grâce à une œuvre à vocation civile que Servanty acquit sa notoriété : la direction technique du programme Concorde pour la partie française. L’amitié nouée entre Servanty et son homologue anglais Bill Strang permit en particulier au projet de surmonter les nombreuses difficultés d’une collaboration franco-britannique pas toujours évidente au niveau politique.

Servanty mena à bien la totalité du programme d’essais mais, subitement décédé en 1973 à 64 ans, ne put assister au premier vol commercial de sa création en 1976. […]

Leon Bourrieau (FR):

Bourrieau eut l’honneur d’être le premier à faire voler le Fouga « Sylphe ” modèle probatoire, le 14 juillet 1949. Il mit au point cet appareil ainsi que les bancs volants Fouga « Gémeaux ” pour le réacteur Turbomeca. Finalement, le 23 juillet 1952, il y a trente-cinq ans, il décolla le prototype du « Magister “, dessiné par Robert Castello et Mauboussin (d’ou l’appellation C.M. 170), consacré par 871 exemplaires dont beaucoup volent toujours! Léon Bourrieau fut d’abord militaire. La finesse de son pilotage lui valut d’appartenir à la « Patrouille acrobatique d’Etampes ” et d’assumer les responsabilités de moniteur.

Pierre Nadot (FR):

Le 27 mai 1955, la Caravelle effectue son premier vol, décollant à 19 h 15, pilotée par Pierre Nadot secondé par André Moynet et accompagné de Jean Avril et Roger Béteille, pour un vol de 22 minutes. Pour ce premier essai, l’avion restant à basse vitesse, les volets de bord de fuite ne sont pas sollicités. […]

Yves Brunaud (FR):

Le 30 Janvier 1959, le Br-1150 Atlantic motorisé par des turbopropulseurs Rolls-Royce Tyne fut sélectionné par l’OTAN parmi 21 projets. Le 2 Octobre 1961, la SECBAT (Société Européenne pour la Construction du Breguet Atlantic) fut crée.

Les sociétés suivantes prirent part au programme :

  • Breguet & Dassault-Aviation (France).
  • Fokker (Pays-Bas).
  • Dornier & Siebel (Allemagne)
  • SABCA, Fairey & Fabrique Nationale Herstal (Belgique).

Les turbopropulseurs Tyne étaient fournis par Rolls-Royce, SNECMA-Hispano, FN et MTU; les équipements électroniques par des sociétés Américaines. Les chaînes de production ont été installées dans les usines Breguet de Toulouse.

Quatre prototypes furent construits. Le premier effectua son vol initial le 21 Octobre 1961 avec Bernard Witt, Roméo Zinzoni et René Périneau aux commandes. Le second vola le 23 Février 1962, piloté par Yves Brunaud, M. Raymond et René Périneau.

Franz Joseph Strauss (EN):

Franz Josef Strauss […] was a German politician. He was the chairman of the Christian Social Union, member of the federal cabinet in different positions and long-time minister-president of the state of Bavaria.

As an aerospace enthusiast, Strauss was one of the driving persons to create Airbus in the 1970s. He served as Chairman of Airbus in the late 1980s, until his death in 1988 […]. Munich’s new airport, the Franz Josef Strauss Airport, was named after him in 1992.

This list is far from covering all pioneers, nor all the great engineers that built French aviation during the past century. This is just a random walk through Blagnac streets.

While looking for these characters I stumbled upon a great site with a good collection of French aviation characters: “L’Aviation Française: des Hommes et des Ailes“.

PD1: Be sure that not all streets are named after aviation pioneers… I got to meet several doctors, writers, etc. 😉

PD2: Emphasis are mine. Most of the excerpts come from Wikipedia articles.

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So much for composites…

Few weeks ago I was talking to a stress engineer from Eurocopter Spain about the different activities they performed. He was looking forward to the future work in relation to the latest EC 175, a helicopter built in cooperation with China for civilian and parapublic markets, mainly to support oil and gas exploration and search and rescue missions.

“At last we’re back to metal structures…”

He mentioned this in relation to apparent problems given by composites ones in their use in helicopters. This reminded me of a teacher (at engineering school) and former (very senior) colleague at Airbus Military, who was never seduced by the massive application of composites and he always called for their introduction following his mantra:

“Technology (in the context of application of science), is the most powerful means to increase the effectiveness-to-cost ratio.”

Which not always calls for the use of the latest technology available.

So much for the hype of composites…

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Aircraft market forecasts accuracy

In a previous post I wrote about how the predicted average aircraft size by Boeing in 1990 did not match the actual evolution of that average size since then. In a more general context, how accurate are these aircraft market forecasts? Especially taking into account that they forecast along a 20-year period.

I dug in the archives and found an article in Flight International‘s issue of 10-16 March 1993 which compared Airbus’ GMF and Boeing’s CMO (you can find 2012 comparison here). Some excerpts from that article:

  • “Boeing is projecting deliveries of 12,005 aircraft, worth $815 billion at current values, from 1993 to 2010.”
  • (Boeing) “The trend towards larger aircraft will accelerate so that, although single-aisle types will account for about two-thirds of all deliveries, they will comprise 74% of those up to 2000 and only 60% beyond.”
  • “Airbus Industrie has released an upbeat forecast, predicting market demand for 11,653 new jet airliners to be delivered during 1992-2011, up from the 11,500 deliveries predicted in 1991.”
  • (Airbus) “The manufacturer foresees an accelerating demand for widebodied aircraft, driving average airliner size from today’s 176 seats to 255 seats in 20 years.”
  • (Airbus) “The global jet-airliner fleet will grow to 10,000 by 1998 and to almost 15,000 by 2011.

Now, let’s see what was the fleet at the end of 2011. Seeing Airbus’ Global Market Forecast from 2012, the departing numbers are those of 2011 fleet.

  • Passenger aircraft: 15,556 a/c.
  • Freighter aircraft: 1,615 a/c.

Thus, 17,171 a/c at the end 0f 2011. The GMF from 1992 underestimated the 20-year market by slightly above 2,100 or nearly 15% error. Not a bad shot taking into account the time span used.

Let’s take a more recent example, this time from Boeing. In the CMO from 1997, we find the following chart showing Boeing’s forecasted fleet size and distribution for 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 year-ends.

1997 Boeing CMO year-end fleet forecasts for 2001, 2006, 2011 & 2016.

In 2012 CMO, Boeing offered figures of 2011 year-end fleet.

Fleet at year end 2011 according to Boeing 2012 CMO.

We can make a quick comparison:

Comparison of aircraft fleet at year-end 2011: 1997 forecast vs. actual (sources: Boeing CMO 1997 and 2012).

Some reflections:

  • The total fleet figure was missed only by 1%.
  • The single-aisle figure was missed only by 2%, though less larger single-aisle were acquired than expected.
  • Where the forecast is off mark is in both regional jets (underestimated) and twin-aisle, where there are almost 1,800 less aircraft in the current fleet than forecasted… another reason for Boeing to play down on A380 segment.

***

NOTE: Figures of current fleet from Boeing and Airbus differ. Some causes: Airbus does not include figures for regional jets, and definitions between large aircraft and twin-aisle vary from one company to the other. Other than that, figures for freighters are similar, 1,615 (A) vs. 1,740 (B), as they are for passenger single-aisles, 12,161 (A) vs 12,030 (B).

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